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at Universitas Al Azhar, Jakarta 
The unseen power of China
Thung Ju Lan
AbstrAct
China’s soft power is a difficult concept to measure if the Confucius Institute 
is the only source relied on. Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power puts a strong 
emphasis on “the power of attraction” as a tool to persuade or “to shape the 
preferences of others” in the worlds of business and politics. To understand how 
this soft power - or the Confucius Institute - works, we have to determine the 
“observable” power of the “intangible” attraction embedded in it. This observable 
but intangible attraction is assumed to be “embedded”in the language and culture 
offered by the Institute, namely so-called “shared values”. However, without 
having attended its classes, it is difficult to see which values are being shared 
with the local students. Despite this handicap, it is very apparent that the image 
of China itself has acted as an attraction. An attraction to China was visible 
already, even before the Confucius Institute was established. For Indonesians, 
China is a big country which has exerted its power there for a long time through 
its diaspora and/or exports. Therefore, the Confucius Institute is just one of the 
many forms of Chinese-ness within their purview. Certainly, the Confucius 
Institute might have assisted in adjusting negative impressions and expelling 
some of the reservations the Indonesians have about China. Nevertheless, its 
influence  extends to only a limited number of people who are closely engaged 
with the Institute.
148 149Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) Thung Ju Lan, Confucius Institute at Universitas Al Azhar, Jakarta 
Keywords
Confucius Institute; Universitas Al Azhar; China; soft power; (Chinese) 
Indonesians.
IntroductIon1
The emergence of China as a new global player has been perceived in different 
ways. Some consider China a “threat” because, as Arvind Subramanian 
in Eclipse; Living in the shadow of China’s economic dominance (2011: xiii) 
has suggested, “China’s dominance [is not only] more imminent, [but 
also] broader in scope, and much larger in magnitude, than is currently 
imagined”. Others, such as David Shambaugh in China goes global; The 
partial power (which is published in 2013) believe that, “China’s influence 
is still more broad than deep and that it lacks the influence attributed to a 
major world power [...] China is a ‘partial power’” (as quoted from Schiliró 
2013: no pagenumber).  But the fact remains that China aims to have a wider 
and a more significant role in world economic affairs as its investment 
abroad in raw materials, energy, the nuclear sector and banking and 
finance has been increasing. The KPMG2’s report3 points out that, “China’s 
outward direct investment (ODI) overtook inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in 2014, by a narrow margin, making the country a net capital exporter 
for the first time. China’s Ministry of Commerce estimates that the total ODI 
volume for 2014 stands at around USD 120 billion, a 10 percent rise from 
USD 108 billion in 2013”. Nevertheless, China’s image as “the fifth column” 
seems to persist and works as an obstacle to the concept of China’s “peaceful 
rise”.4 Geoff Wade (2013), for example, highlights “China’s six wars in the 
next 50 years”, indicating that Chinese military action has never been ruled 
out. Therefore, quoting the Chicago Tribune, Johannes Dragbaek Schmidt (2008: 
24) believes that “China is using ‘soft power’ remedies to nurture ’alliances 
with many developing countries to solidify its position in the World Trade 
Organization, flex its muscles on the world stage and act as a counterbalance 
to US power’”.
In the past, the Indonesia-China relationship has not run smoothly for 
reasons both historical and political: China was accused of being involved in 
the Communist Party’s coup d’etat of 1965 which rocked the country and led to 
1 This research is part of SEASREP (Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program) 
Project on “China’s ‘soft’ footprint in Southeast Asia”, 2013-2014.  
2 KPMG, operates in 152 countries and have 189,000 people working around the world 
providing Audit, Tax and Advisory services (https://home.kpmg.com/cn/en/home/about.
html, accessed on 22-2-2017). KPMG is the abbreviation of Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 
the initials of its principal founding members, namely Piet Klynveld, William Barclay Peat, 
James Marwick and Dr. Reinhard Goerdeler (http://kpmgcampus.com/kpmg-family/kpmg-
history.shtml, accessed on 22-2-2017).
3 “China outlook 2015” (http://www.kpmg.com/ES/es/Internacionalizacion-KPMG/
Documents/China-Outlook-2015.pdf, accessed on 23-9-2015).
4 “China’s peaceful rise; Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004” (https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20050616bijianlunch.pdf, accessed on 23-9-2015).
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the death of hundred thousands of Indonesian people.5 The Indonesia–China 
diplomatic relationship was frozen for about a quarter of a century from 
1965 to 1990. However, the increased integration of the Chinese economy 
into the world market, heralded by its entry into membership in World 
Trade Organization (WTO) on December 2001, cannot be ignored, because 
China’s trade and investment policies are very likely to have an impact on 
other developing countries, Indonesia included. Since Indonesia restored its 
diplomatic relationship with China in 1990, the volume of trade between the 
two countries has increased significantly. Indonesia’s non-oil and gas export 
to China between 1991 and 1998, for example, increased from around USD 580 
million to over USD 1,320 million.6 Similarly, Indonesia’s imports from China 
grew from around USD 800 million in 1991 to around USD 1,270 million in 
1997, but then fell to USD 980 million in 1998, perhaps on account of the severe 
economic crisis in Indonesia.7 According to Antaranews.com,8 during the period 
January to June 2013, Indonesia`s exports to China touched USD 10.09 billion 
or 13.5 percent of the country`s total exports. Its imports from China reached 
USD 14.42 billion. Today, Indonesia under the leadership of President Joko 
Widodo seems to be taking steps to draw closer to China. As reported by GIV 
News, in November 2014, Joko Widodo went to Beijing on his first state visit 
as the President of Indonesia, and he “delivered a memorable presentation 
at the APEC CEO Summit, opened the Indonesia-China Business Forum, 
conducted a bilateral talk with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and secured 
twelve economic cooperation MoUs totalling more than IDR 253 trillion (USD 
19 billion)”.9 It was also reported that, “[f]ive months later, President Joko 
Widodo returned to Beijing and held meetings with the Chinese President 
Xi Jinping, Chairman of the People’s National Congress Zhang Dejiang, and 
Prime Minister Li Keqiang”. Both presidents expressed their willingness to 
translate the existing relationship into more beneficial cooperation in projects, 
and Widodo went back home with a “gift of investment commitments totalling 
IDR 890 trillion (USD 68.4 billion)”.10 This closer relationship with China did 
not come suddenly. In 2005, Indonesia – under the leadership of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) – and China had agreed to establish a 
bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership to boost cooperation between the 
two countries in various fields (namely, industry, infrastructure development 
in the transportation sector, financial services, tourism, education and the 
creative industry). This was strengthened during President Xi Jinping’s two-
5 The MLM Revolutionary Study Group in the US, “The destruction of the Indonesian 
Communist Party in 1965 and the road not taken”, July 2007, (http://www.mlmrsg.com/
attachments/article/75/ The%20Destruction %20 of%20the%20Indonesian%20 Communist%20
Party%20-%20revised%202013.pdf, accessed on 26-9-2015).
6 Atje and Gaduh 1999.
7 See Atje and Gaduh 1999.
8 “Indonesia, China forge comprehensive strategic partnership in various field”, Antaranews.
com 7 October 2013.
9 Kosasih, Felix Utama, “Is Indonesia shifting orientation to China?”, GIV News 7 May 2015.
10 See footnote 9.
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day state visit to Jakarta in 2013.11 In view of this change in the relationship 
between Indonesia and China, it would be very interesting to figure out how 
China’s “soft power” remedies have worked in Indonesia.
The Confucius Institute has been established by the Chinese in many 
countries in Asia, Europe, and America and is believed to be the flagship of 
China’s “soft power” which “penetrates” the countries surrounding and far 
away from China, mainly for the benefit of the Chinese themselves.
As China’s economy and exchanges with the world have seen rapid growth, 
there has also been a sharp increase in the world’s demands for Chinese learning. 
Benefiting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain’s experience in promoting 
their national languages, China began its own exploration through establishing 
non-profit public institutions which aim to promote Chinese language and culture 
in foreign countries in 2004: these were given the name the Confucius Institute.12
As of Nov 2009, 282 Confucius Institutes and 272 Confucius Classrooms in 88 
countries and regions have been established. In Asia, there are 70 Confucius 
Institutes and 27 Confucius Classrooms.13
Through the joint efforts of China and the Confucius Institute host countries 
in addition to the enthusiasm and active support of people all over the world, 
by the end of 2010, there have been 322 Confucius Institutes and 369 Confucius 
Classrooms established in 96 countries. In addition, some 250 institutions from 
over 50 countries have expressed requirements for establishing Confucius 
Institutes/Classrooms, amongst them some of the world’s top universities.14
This year [2014] marks the 10th anniversary of the Confucius Institute,15 a network 
of 353 institutes and 473 classrooms around the world funded by the Chinese 
government. Some feel that the institutes have done little to change the impression 
people have of China, yet others feel quite strongly that they have helped craft 
China’s International image, and expand China’s soft power.16
There have been seven Confucius Institutes established in Indonesia. They 
are the Jakarta BTIP (Bina Terampil Insan Persada) Kongzi Institute, the Pusat 
Bahasa Mandarin at Hasanuddin University (哈山努丁大学孔子学院, officially 
opened on 22 February 2011), the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Malang State 
University (玛琅国立大学孔子学院), the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Maranatha 
Christian University (马达拉塔基督教大学孔子学院, officially opened on 
January 2011), the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Tanjungpura University (丹戎
11 See footnote 8.
12 “About Confucius Institute Classroom”, Hanban, (http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.
htm, accessed on 22-1- 2014).
13 “Confucius Institute in Asia”, Confucius Institute, Worldwide, (http://college.chinese.cn/
en/node_3757.htm, accessed on 24-4-2013).
14 “Confucius Institutes in the world”, Introduction, (http://college.chinese.cn/en/node_1979.
htm, accessed on  24-4-2013).
15 The first Confucius Institute was established in Seoul, South Korea in 2004 (see Michael 
Ardaiolo 2013b).
16 Melissa Sim 2014. 
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布拉大学孔子学院, officially opened on 26 November 2011), the Pusat Bahasa 
Mandarin at Al Alzhar University  (阿拉扎大学孔子学院, officially announced 
on 8 November 2012), and the  Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Universitas Negeri 
Surabaya (泗水国立大学孔子学院). With the exception of the BTIP,17 the other 
six university institutes were established by an agreement signed by the 
representatives of both governments on 28 June 2010.18
If we take into the consideration that President SBY had made overtures 
to China before the Confucius Institute was established in Indonesia, any 
assertion that the Confucius Institute might have influenced the relationship 
between China and Indonesia in the first place makes little sense. Even so, we 
should be aware that, even though the first Confucius Institute (established 
on 28 September 2007) was attached to the Jakarta BTIP Kongzi Institute, a 
privately funded Mandarin language course, it was Ambassador Lan Lijun 
who signed the agreement of co-operation with the Jakarta Chinese Language 
Teaching Centre (BTIP - 雅加达汉语教学中心孔子学院) on behalf of the Office 
of Chinese International Language Council (Hanban). Obviously, from China’s 
perspective, the unofficial relationship has a similar significance to that of 
the official one. He also delivered a speech, saying that the “establishment 
of the first Confucius Institute in Indonesia is a milestone in the educational 
cooperation between China and Indonesia”. He hoped that the Confucius 
Institute would “make contributions to the enhancement of the understanding 
and friendship between the two peoples and strengthen the education and 
cultural exchanges and cooperation between two sides”. Unquestionably, the 
Confucius Institute signifies the beginning of a “new” level of China-Indonesia 
friendship, albeit initiated unofficially. 
chInA’s soft power: A conceptuAl frAmeworK
Recently, we often hear the term “soft power” used to label and question a 
presumably great influence that one country has over the other(s). China is 
one of the countries in question. Joseph Nye19 coined the term “soft power” 
in the late 1980s, but what is “soft power”? The most widely held definition 
of power as the capacity to do things and to affect the behaviour of others to 
make those things happen.20 Nye himself defined soft power as “the ability 
to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion”. 
Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. In the business 
world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing 
commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do 
17 BTIP contact person is Philip Liwan Pangkey (http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/whjy/
lxxx/t393549.htm, accessed on 22-1-2014).
18 See http://college.chinese.cn/en/node_3760_2.htm, accessed on 27-6-2013.
19 Joseph S. Nye Jr. is the writer of Soft power; The means to success in world politics (New York: 
Public Afair, 2005).
20 Tysha Bohorquez reviews Joseph Nye Jr.’s book on the importance of soft power. Published 
1 December 2005, (http://www.international.ucla.edu/asia/article/34734, accessed on 24-4-
2013).
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what you want. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing 
rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community 
wants to help them achieve shared objectives.
 
Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If I 
can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks 
to make you do it. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability 
to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an 
attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that 
are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values 
that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.
 
Soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also 
rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than 
just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an 
important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to 
acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power. 
Soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.
 
If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or 
exchange taking place – in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable 
but intangible attraction – soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type 
of currency – not force, not money – to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction 
to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement.21
The Chinese government (and the Communist Party of China)’s dream of 
becoming a superpower is not a secret, but the realization that to achieve the 
goal it must also use “soft-power” to influence the world has dawned only 
recently. He Qinglian (2009) says that the first government scholar to put 
forward this view was Zheng Bijian, who wrote an essay entitled “China’s 
peaceful rise to great-power status” in 2005.22 The essay was published 
in Foreign Affairs and was later re-published on the China Daily website 
under the headline “The new path of China’s peaceful rise and US–China 
relations”.23 Since then, the idea of China’s soft-power has become a hot topic 
of discussion both inside and outside China. In 2007, President Hu Jintao 
told the Seventeenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that China 
needed to invest more in its soft power resources. Afterwards, China spent 
billions of dollars on following his advice, partly through its aid programmes 
to Africa and Latin America, partly by publicizing high-profile gestures, such 
as building stadiums (Beijing Olympics 2008 and Shanghai Expo 2010), as 
well as by founding several hundred Confucius Institutes around the world 
21 “The benefits of soft power” by Joseph S. Nye Jr, 8 February 2004. Reproduced with 
permission of “Soft power and leadership”, Compass; A Journal of Leadership (Spring 2004). 
Compass is published by the Center for Public Leadership, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, (http://hbswk.hbs.edu/ archive/4290.html, accessed on 
24-4-2013).
22 He Qinglian 2009.
23 He Qinglian 2009.
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to teach its language and culture.24 
Publicly announced as one of the most appropriate ways to develop 
cultural exchanges and understandings between China and related countries, 
the Confucius Institute has played an important role in gathering and 
establishing a group of local people who welcome and support China’s 
friendly attitude. 
Over recent years, the Confucius Institutes’ development has been sharp and 
they have provided scope for people all over the world to learn about Chinese 
language and culture. In addition they have become a platform for cultural 
exchanges between China and the world as well as a bridge reinforcing friendship 
and cooperation between China and the rest of the world and are much welcomed 
across the globe [...].
Confucius Institutes/Classrooms adopt flexible teaching patterns and adapt to 
suit local conditions when teaching Chinese language and promoting culture 
in foreign primary schools, secondary schools, communities and enterprises. In 
2009, Confucius Institutes/Classrooms around the world offered 9,000 Chinese 
courses of a multitude of styles, with a total enrollment of 260,000, a 130,000 strong 
enrollment increase from the previous year. More than 7,500 cultural exchange 
activities took place, involving the participation of over 3 million reaching double 
the participation figures of the corresponding period of the previous year.25
Confucius Institutes outside Indonesia have been thoroughly studied. For 
example, by analysing the details behind the establishment of Confucius 
Institutes, their organizational mechanism, and their activities in several 
countries, Zhe Ren (2012: abstract) found that, because of an “insufficiency 
of cultural content and key concepts which can typify contemporary China”, 
it was “hard to see Confucius Institutes as China’s soft power”. He argues 
that, although cultural activities – beside language education – form “the core 
of the operations that Confucius Institutes engage in overseas”, practically 
“nothing is likely to come to mind right away if they are asked to provide 
one for Chinese popular culture” (Zhe Ren 2012: 13, 19) [something original 
which is associated with China mainland], not like when they are asked about 
American popular culture [that is Hollywood), or Japanese popular culture 
[that is manga or anime]. Joe Tin-yau Lo and Suyan Pan (2014: abstract, 14) 
who were - because of their analysis of resources, strategies and outcomes 
- inquisitive about “the dilemmas and predicaments of the [Confucius 
Institute] project in the exercise of soft power in the globalised age”, came 
to a conclusion that, “China has emphasized resource provision rather than 
creating appropriate, non-coercive and inter-culturally sensitive strategies 
to bring about the intended outcomes”. Clearly, Lo and Pan have developed 
a relatively similar argument to that of Zhe Ren, suggesting that “China’s 
lack of attractiveness in cultural diplomacy [...] has something to do with its 
24 Joseph S. Nye 2012.
25 “Confucius Institutes in the world”, Introduction, (http://college.chinese.cn/en/node_1979.
htm, accessed on 24-4-2013).
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deficiency in the national values that appeal to foreign audiences”. Others, for 
instance, Falk Hartig (2010: 11), have also doubted the effectiveness of China’s 
soft power because in his opinion, “Confucius Institutes lack one feature 
which is essential for institutions like German Goethe-Institute or British 
Council”, namely “the principle of non-intervention by the government”, 
therefore, “when it comes to certain sensitive topics, Confucius Institutes turn 
quiet or even silent”. In his eyes, this trait means that “[Confucius Institutes] 
don’t practice comprehensive and pure cultural diplomacy, but much more 
a cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics“(Hartig 2010: 11). In line 
with Hartig’s point of view, Jennifer Hubbert’s study of a Confucius Institute-
sponsored tour,26 namely: the Chinese Bridge Summer Camp suggests that, 
“[that] particular structuring of desire failed to resonate with” what Hubbert 
referred to as “locally-embedded expectations for identity construction 
through prefigured notions of authenticity and value”. 
Framing the role of Confucius Institutes in Indonesia within Nye’s 
definition of soft power is not an easy job, because it is so strongly intertwined 
with China’s power strategy and diplomacy. He Qinglian (2009: no page 
number) has divided China’s diplomacy into three levels: great power 
diplomacy (with the the US at the core), border diplomacy and resource 
diplomacy. He argues that China’s soft power penetration falls into three 
different categories as well, namely: economic aid, economic cooperation 
and cultural penetration. In his opinion, “[f]oreign aid and comprehensive, 
mutually-penetrating economic relations are the core of China’s ‘soft power’ 
resources” (He Qinglian 2009). He postulates that, “[T]his, unlike the ‘soft 
power’ recognized by the international community, is actually the ‘hard 
power’ of economic strength being peddled by China as ‘soft power’” (He 
Qinglian 2009). It means that, under the promise of ”incentives”, Chinese 
Communist cultural values and ideas cloaked in Confucius Institutes, have 
been devised to get the world “to accept a ‘Chinese culture’ whose flavour has 
long ago gone bad”(He Qinglian 2009). Undoubtedly, economic and cultural 
elements are inseparable in China’s so-called “soft power”. I propose to look 
at these two factors through an in-depth study of the Confucius Institute at the 
Universitas Al Azhar. This institute is the only one, among the six Confucius 
Institutes officially established in Indonesia in 2011, which is located in Jakarta, 
the capital city. 
the hIstory And the lAunchIng of the confucIus InstItute At the 
unIversItAs Al AzhAr, JAKArtA
The Pusat Bahasa Mandarin (Mandarin Language Centre) at Universitas Al 
Azhar Jakarta (Illustration 1),27 which commenced teaching in 2011, is one 
example of a Confucius Institute. Interestingly, in Chinese (Mandarin), this 
26 Jennifer Hubbert 2014.
27 Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia is a private university which was established in 2000. It 
has six departments, namely: economics, law, social and political sciences, psychology and 
education, science and technology, and literature, (http://uai.ac.id/, accessed on 10-7-2014).
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Pusat Bahasa Mandarin is still called the Kongzi Xueyuan 孔子學院.28
The idea to set up the Institute, according to one of the lecturers in the 
Faculty of Arts at the Universitas Al Azhar who claimed that she was the first 
Indonesian director of Confucius Institute at the university, came from the 
Hanban representative or contact person in Indonesia.29 However, it has also 
been said that the Institute was co-established by the Fujian Normal University 
28 Http://pbmuai.id.chinesecio.com/.
29 The Hanban is a Beijing-based organization affiliated with China’s education ministry. 
Aubrey Belford (2012) has stated that, “[w]hile nominally non-governmental, the organisation’s 
leadership, including its director, Xu Lin, is largely comprised of Communist Party officials”.
Source: Nabil Forum (third edition, 
July 2011: 6).
Illustration 1. The Confucius Institute at Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia.
Source: Https://www.google.co.id/search?q=yayasan+Nabil&source=lnms&tbm
=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjqs9i99tTSAhWLv48KHQXnDMwQ_AUIBigB&bi=1
600&bih=791#tbs=isz:l&tbm=isch&q=universitas+al+azhar+indonesia&*&imgr=
aqYJjTsXDmZXWM, accessed on 14-3-2017.
156 157Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) Thung Ju Lan, Confucius Institute at Universitas Al Azhar, Jakarta 
and the Universitas Al-Azhar.30 Another source of information indicated that 
the Confucius Institute – Kongzi Xueyuan 孔子学院 (Pusat Bahasa Mandarin) 
at the Universitas Al Azhar, Jakarta was built with philanthropic donations 
from a number of Chinese Indonesians. What is the true story behind all this 
information? It is also an interesting journey of discovery to find why the 
Institute was established in a Muslim-based university, instead of a “nationally 
known as a multicultural university” institution of higher learning like the 
Universitas Indonesia.
Searching for relevant written documents, I found a signed agreement of 
28 June 2010 which was drawn up between the Office of Chinese Language 
Council International of China (Hanban 汉办) and the Universitas Al Azhar 
Indonesia (UAI).31 It covers the rights and responsibilities of each institution 
in the establishment and management of the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at the 
Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia. Besides this agreement, the Universitas 
Al Azhar Indonesia also signed an agreement (2 November 2010), plus an 
addendum (15 June 2011), to build the office of Confucius Institute with the 
assistance of the Yayasan Nation Building (Nabil) under the leadership of 
Eddie Lembong, one of the well-known ethnic Chinese leaders who emerged 
after the tragic events of May 1998.32 This involvement of the Yayasan Nabil 
is highlighted by an inscribed stone set up in front of the Confucius Institute 
at the Universitas Al Azhar. The inscription specifies that the building was 
constructed with a donation from Burhan Uray (Huang Shuang’an; also known 
as Datuk Seri Bong Swan Ann), a Chinese Indonesian who owns the Djajanti 
30 It seems that with the establishment of the Confucius Institute, which is known in Indonesian 
as the “Pusat Bahasa Mandarin” (Mandarin Language Centre), each Indonesian university enters 
into a collaboration with a university in China: Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia with Fujian 
Normal University, Universitas Hasanuddin with Nanchang University, Universitas Negeri 
Malang with Guangxi Normal University, Universitas Kristen Maranatha with Hebei Normal 
University, Universitas Negeri Surabaya with Huazhong Normal University, and Universitas 
Tanjungpura with Northeast Normal University (Kominfonewscenter.com, “Selected News; Pusat 
Bahasa Mandarin akan dibentuk pada 6 universitas di Indonesia”, http://kominfonewscenter.
com/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=397:pusat-bahasa-mandarin-akan-
dibentuk-pada-6-universitas -di-indonesia& catid=36:nasional-khusus&Itemid=54, accessed 
on 27-6-2013 ).
31 Those documents were uploaded on the Al Azhar website during my first search in 2013, 
but later I could no longer find them.
32 The so-called tragic event of May 1998 was a series of violent riots all over Indonesia. This 
was followed by the resignation from power of Suharto (see Pandika, Melissa, “Remembering 
the May 1998 Riots in Indonesia, http://www.ozy.com/flashback/indonesias-1998-riots-
remembered/31732.article, accessed on 19-8-2014).
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Group33 through the mediation of the Nabil Foundation.34 The Hanban News, 
on the other hand, reported the signing of an agreement between the Hanban 
and the Minister of Education and Culture of Indonesia (Illustration 2).
The Hanban News says that, “[i]n the presence of Mr Li Changchun, 
a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee, and Mr Marzuki Alie, Speaker of the Indonesia House 
of Representatives, Mme Xu Lin, Director-General of the Hanban, China and 
Mr Syawal Gultom, Representative of the Minister of Education and Culture, 
Indonesia, signed the Cooperation Agreement on Cultivating Indonesian 
Chinese Language Teachers in Jakarta in the evening of 26 April 2012”.  It 
also said that “[a]ccording to the Agreement, the Hanban and the Ministry 
of Education and Culture of Indonesia will work together to cultivate 100 
Chinese language teachers in three years from 2012 to 2014 and each training 
33 As reported by Kompas.com, on Thursday, 8 November 2012, when officially announcing 
the opening of the office of Pusat Bahasa Mandarin (PBM – Mandarin Language Centre) 
Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia (UAI) on the UAI campus, the Head of UAI Prof Dr Zuhal also 
launched a book entitled Burhan Uray berbakti untuk Indonesia. The book was written by Betty 
Pay, Uray’s wife. It tells the lifestory of Burhan Uray who commenced life very poor”bocah 
penyadap karet” in North Kalimantan, but now at the age of 82 is a successful businessman 
who has contributed enormously to social and educational foundations, (http://edukasi.
kompas.com/read/2012/11/09/12174472/Al.Azhar.Bangun.Pusat.Bahasa.Mandarin, accessed 
on 27-6-2013; Current Link: http://internasional.kompas.com/read/2012/11/09/12174472/
Al.Azhar.Bangun.Pusat.Bahasa.Mandarin, accessed on 17-5-2015).
34 See Nabil Forum (third edition, July 2011), column on Cooperation, pp. 5-7, (http://www.
nabilfoundation.org/ media.php?module=publikasi&id=186, accessed on 27-6-2013).
Illustration 2. Signing the Cooperation Agreement by the Director-General of the 
Hanban, Xu Lin, and the Representative of the Minister of Education and Culture 
of Indonesia. Source: Hanban News, Information Centre of Confucius Institute 
at Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia, 28 April 2012, (http://english.hanban.org/
article/2012-04/28/content_431010.htm, accessed on 27 June 2013).
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will last six months. Mr Huang Shuang’an (Burhan Uray), a prominent leader 
of Indonesian Chinese will provide air ticket subsidy for trainees coming 
to China. The specific work of the Agreement will be jointly undertaken by 
the Centre for Development and Empowerment of Language Teachers and 
Education Personnel of the Ministry of Education and Culture of Indonesia, 
Jakarta Chinese Language Coordination Office and Confucius Institute at 
Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia”. 
Obviously, some pretty complicated networking was going on behind the 
scenes at the establishment of the Confucius Institute at the Universitas Al 
Azhar. I hope a further study can unravel how many contributions Chinese 
Indonesians made towards the Institute, their underlying reasons for making 
the contributions, as well as the extent of their local and regional networking 
in response to China’s “soft power”. 
My interview of 30 July 2013 with Eddie Lembong, the Chairman of the 
Nabil Foundation which facilitated the generous involvement of Burhan 
Uray, the leader of Djajanti Group, in the building of the Confucius Institute 
at Universitas Al Azhar, reveals that the motives of these ethnic Chinese 
leaders are not entirely philanthropic, they also have political overtones.35 
Eddie Lembong underlined that indigenous Indonesians need to learn about 
China in order to make them less prejudice towards the Chinese. In order to 
mark their contribution, these ethnic Chinese leaders asked for the following 
inscription to be attached to the wall of the Confucius Institute (Illustrations 
3a and 3b).
35 See also Nabil Forum (third edition, July 2011: 5). In the report about its cooperation with 
Universitas Al Azhar in the building of the Confucius Institute office, Yayasan Nabil argued that 
the cooperation was both a direct and indirect implementation of the Yayasan Nabil doctrine 
of “Cross-Cultural Fertilization” between Indonesian Culture and Chinese Culture.
Illustration 3a. The inscription marking Burhan Uray’s donation through the Nabil 
Foundation, June 2011 (photograph by Thung Ju Lan).
160 161Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) Thung Ju Lan, Confucius Institute at Universitas Al Azhar, Jakarta 
36
In the interview, Eddie Lembong also indicated that it was the Universitas Al 
Azhar which had approached him for help in the first place. This story seems 
to be consistent with what Feri Ansori’s said to me during my interview with 
him as the Indonesian Director of Confucius Institute at Al Azhar on 1 August 
2013. He claimed that the Hanban invited the Universitas Al Azhar (UAI) 
to submit a proposal for cooperation because at that time the UAI already 
had a working cooperation with the Fujian Normal University. When their 
proposal was approved by the Hanban, the UAI was faced with the financial 
problem of finding the funds for the building of Confucius Institute Office, 
and it was for this reason it approached Eddie Lembong from the Yayasan 
Nabil. Feri Ansori’s explanation might also shed some light on the reason the 
Confucius Institute was established at the Universitas Al Azhar and not at the 
Universitas Indonesia. If a previous cooperation with Chinese university in 
China is a precondition for cooperation with the Hanban, obviously Al Azhar 
was a better position to accept the invitation. As far as I know, the Chinese 
Studies Programme at the Universitas of Indonesia has not yet developed any 
cooperation with a Chinese university in China because most of its lecturers 
are graduates of Taiwanese universities.
The involvement of the Yayasan Nabil did not finish when the building 
of the office was completed. In 2013, when the Institute faced a bureaucratic 
problem in acquiring visas for teachers from China, it also called on Eddie 
Lembong for help. One of Eddie Lembong’s employees at the Nabil Foundation 
is now a member of what is called the Confucius Institute’s task-force. The 
latest information I have from this task-force shows that the problem they faced 
was more financial than political, because the Institute was not willing to pay 
36 Source: Http://fs.uai.ac.id /?p=655, accessed on 27-1-2014.
Illustration 3b. At the launching of Confucius Institute office on 8 November 2012, 
Burhan Uray’s autobiography (Burhan Uray berbakti untuk Indonesia) which is written 
by his wife, Betty Pay, was presented.36
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for the teachers’ visa application fee which is required under the immigration 
law of the Republic of Indonesia.
ImAge creAtIon
Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit was considered a big event (Illustration 4). The 
picture published in the local media37 and now displayed on the wall of the 
Confucius Institute clearly demonstrate that the establishment of this Institute 
was an undertaking of the Chinese rather than the Indonesian government. 
The official visit of the Indonesian Ambassador to China, Imron Cotan, and 
his associates to the Institute took place a year later, on 26 September 2012.38 
Another interesting fact about Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit is the way chosen to 
describe it, with the caption “Chinese Premier reads Al-Qur’an”.39 Referring 
to the Al-Qur’an, Wen called for world peace and tolerance between nations. 
“I am pleased to see that the University of Al-Azhar has established a partnership 
with China’s Fujian Normal University and students here have started learning 
Chinese language. I believe that the university will gain a better understanding 
of China through close contact with its Chinese counterparts”. (Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s speech at the Confucius Institute at the Universitas Al-Azhar.)
40
Importantly the visit was made during the same visit during which Premier 
Wen Jiabao was scheduled to meet President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,41 
37 A similar picture of the event was published in Tribun Pontianak 30 April 2011, (http://
issuu.com /tripon/docs/30042011, accessed on 22-1-2014). The event was also mentioned by 
VIVAnews, (http:// detikhots.info/page/4140/), and by CRIonline (2011-04-29 18:03:52 CRI), 
(http://indonesian. cri.cn/201/2011/04 /29/1s118027.htm, accessed on 22-1-2014).
38 “Indonesian Ambassador to China visits the Confucius Institute at the University of Al-
Azhar”, Hanban News, [Source] Confucius Institute at the University of Al-Azhar [Time] 2012-
09-29 13:14:41, (http://english.hanban. org/article/2012-09/29/content_465800.htm, accessed 
on 22-1-2014).
39 Https://forum.lowyat.net/topic/1858048/all, accessed on 22-1-2014.
40 Photographed by Yao Dawei, reporter from the Xinhua News Agency, “Highlights of Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Confucius Institute at the University of Al-Azhar, Indonesia”, 
(http://english.hanban.org/ article/2011-04/29/content_257863.htm, accessed on 22-1-2014).
41 “Sore ini Presiden SBY terima kunjungan PM Cina”, Tempo.co, Politik, 29 April 2011. 
Illustration 4. Premier Wen Jiabao visited the Universitas Al-Azhar on 29 April 2011.40
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therefore it can assumed that the visit to Al Azhar also fell into the category of 
diplomacy and bilateral cooperation. This supposition is strengthened by the 
fact that the “Agreement between the Hanban and the Ministry of Education of 
the Republic of  Indonesia about Cooperation in the Teaching of Chinese” was 
also recorded in the ”Executive Summary” (pp. 52–55 about China), uploaded 
by the Embassy of Indonesia as part of bilateral cooperation in the field of 
education.42 However, this official agreement, particularly Article 4 no. A.2 
and its addendum (see Appendix 1), obviously contradicts the recent problem 
faced by the Confucius Institute at UAI arising from visa application fee for 
its teachers imported from China. Was it perhaps a mere copy of what has 
happened to Confucius Institutes in the US where, under a State Department 
directive, their Chinese teachers might be forced to return to China?43
the orgAnIzAtIon of the confucIus InstItute At the unIversItAs Al AzhAr 
Besides the physical fact of classrooms in which Chinese teachers give 
instruction being set up in the Universitas Al Azhar, and a number of local 
people and students learning Chinese language, poetry, as well as traditional 
dances and songs, the Institute does not particularly stand out.44 Perhaps it is 
quite similar to an English teaching classes, albeit more relaxed. However, it 
is pretty remarkable that at the ninth Confucius Institute Conference held in 
Xiamen, Fujian Province, on 7 December 2014, the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at 
Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia received the “Confucius Institute of the Year” 
award for its outstanding achievements in the year of 2014. As reported, within 
the four years since its establishment, the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Universitas 
Al Azhar Indonesia had successfully “set up over ten teaching sites in schools 
and government departments in Indonesia, including universities in Jakarta, 
the Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, the Indonesian National 
Police Headquarters45 and the Ministry of National Defense”.46 Moreover, in 
2014 alone, the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia also 
“hosted fifty-one various cultural activities with altogether 29, 870 participants. 
These included a series of celebrations of the ”Confucius Institute Day”, 
commemorative activities on the tenth anniversary of the Confucius Institute, 
Chinese cultural experience activities, intercultural exchange forums, the 
42 “Ringkasan Eksekutif”, (http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/features/pdf/
Diplomasi_2011.pdf, accessed on 22-1-2014).
43 The directive said that “[A]cademics, under a college’s J-1 exchange program, that teach 
students of elementary or secondary school age are in violation of visa regulations, and said 
they must return to China by the end of June to reapply for an appropriate program”, (see “US 
targets Confucius Institutes over visas”, ChinaDaily.com.cn, 25-5-2012).
44 However, it is easy to identify the area assigned to the Institute because its Chinese decorative 
themes (Chinese lampions); see Illustration 5.
45 “The fourth teaching cooperation between the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at University of 
Al Azhar and the Language Center of Indonesian National Police Headquarters officially 
launched”, Hanban News, [Source] Confucius Institute at Universitas Al-Azhar, 29-5-2013 
14:45:58, (http://english.hanban.org/article/2013-05/29/content_498605.htm, accessed on 
27-1-2014).
46 Gu Shihong 2014.
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2014 first China Movie Week at the Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia”, which, 
according to Gu Shihong from www.chinanews.com, “were all popular 
among the local young people and other residents”.47 Clearly, there is more 
than meets the eye to the Confucius Institute at Universitas Al Azhar than its 
mere physical presence (Illustration 5).
There are two directors who work together to manage Confucius Institute 
at the Universitas Al Azhar, a Chinese director and an Indonesian director. Li 
Qihui, the first Chinese director, served as between 2010 and 2012 (Illustration 
6). He established the Confucius Institute’s Chinese choir, whose purpose was 
to kindle Indonesian students’ interest in learning Chinese by the singing of 
ancient Chinese poetry. The choral group has been extremely popular with 
students.48
 
4950
47 Gu Shihong 2014.
48 “Li Qihui”, Hanban - The Sixth Confucius Institute Conference, 12-14 December 2012, Beijing, 
(http://www.chinese.cn/conference11/article/2011-12/12/content_395456.htm, accessed on 
27-6-2013).
49 Source: https://www.google.co.id/search?q=confucius+institute+di+indonesia&source=
lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjdn5jlidXSAhXJpI8KHYEoCg0Q_AUICSgC&biw=160
0&bih=791#tbm=isch&q=pusat+bahasa+mandarin+universitas+al+azhar+indonesia&*&img
rc=uR1Vw7xx5Za0OM.
50 Source: ”Li Qihui”, Hanban, (http://www.chinese.cn/conference11/article/2011-12/12/
content_395456.htm, accessed on 27-6-2013).
The Chinese lampions.49 The classroom (photograph by Belford 
2012).
Illustration 5. The physical presence of the Confucius Institute at Universitas Al Azhar: 
the Chinese lampions (left) and the classroom (right).
 Illustration 6. Li Qihui (2010-2012).50
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Li Qihui was well-liked. It was reported that, “[u]nder his [read: Li Qihui] 
leadership, the Confucius Institute has enjoyed a close cooperation with 
the Chinese Department of the Universitas Al Azhar, and has selected 
undergraduate students of the university to study for a master’s degree 
in International Chinese Education in China. He has been actively seeking 
support from various parties in an effort to increase the financial resources 
and teaching premises of the Confucius Institute”.51 There was also a list of 
what the institute had accomplished. It was said that, within two years of 
its establishment, the Institute had organized visits to China for secondary 
and college students to participate in the Chinese Bridge-ASEAN Students’ 
Summer Camp. Likewise, the Institute had successfully organized a “China-
ASEAN Friendship Knowledge Contest” for the Indonesian region. It had also 
held a Mandarin language competition, known as the Tenth Chinese Bridge 
for university students, the Fourth Chinese Bridge for senior high school 
students, as well as the First Chinese Bridge for junior high and primary 
school students. Student participants in the competitions were asked to sing 
and read Chinese poems. Utilizing local media resources, the Institute had 
signed cooperation agreements on Chinese language education with major 
local television stations. The Institute had also offered Chinese language classes 
for Indonesian customs officials, at police headquarters52 and for airlines. 
According to one of the Chinese teachers, a statement also confirmed by Feri 
Ansori (the first and previous Indonesian Director), they offered these Chinese 
language classes only to those institutions who had signed agreements or MoU 
with the Confucius Institute at the Universitas Al Azhar. As the organizer of 
Li Lanqing Seal Cutting and Calligraphy Exhibition in Indonesia, the Institute 
offered lectures on seal-cutting and calligraphy, which attracted nearly 1,000 
teachers, students, and local residents.53 Every month the Institute offered 
HSK exams at an international standard (Hanyu Shui Ping Kao Shi 汉语水
平考试) to test Mandarin language competence. The HSK exams offered by 
the Institute were the first computer-based exams in Indonesia.54 It should be 
noted that the Institute charged certain amount money to those who wanted 
to take the HSK exams.55 However, what happened to this money afterwards 
was not entirely clear. 
Li Qihui was replaced by Zhonghua in 2012. Feri Ansori, who has 
51 See footnote 50.
52 Http://english.hanban.org/article/2013-05/29/content_498605.htm, accessed on 27-1-2014. 
See also footnote 45.
53 See footnote 55.
54 “Confucius Institute diresmikan di UAI”, IndonesiaRayaNews.com 21 November 2012.
55 See “Pusat Bahasa Mandarin Al-Azhar: Jadwal ujian HSK dan HSKK IBT (Berbasis 
Komputer) Tahun 2014 [...]”, (https://www.facebook.com/pusatbahasa.mandarin/
posts/241770559334468, accessed on August 20, 2014). These are the fee charged for each 
level of HSK and HSKK: HSK Level 1: Rp 125.000; HSK Level 2: Rp 175.000; HSK Level 3: Rp 
225.000; HSK Level 4: Rp 300.000; HSK Level 5: Rp 350.000; HSk Level 6: Rp 400.000; HSKK 
basic: Rp 100.000; HSKK Intermediate: Rp 150.000; HSKK Advance: Rp 200.000. Contact person 
021 7205089 or Liu Yijiang Laoshi 0838.9441.3428. See also http://beta.kuliahan.org/hsk/, 
accessed on 20-8-2014.
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served as Indonesian director of Confucius Institute since February 2012, is 
also a lecturer in Chinese Studies, Faculty of Letters – Universitas Al Azhar 
Indonesia. He graduated from Yunnan Normal University with a Master’s 
degree in Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language in 2011. At the moment, 
he is pursuing further studies at the Beijing Normal University (BNU) under 
the Confucius Chinese Studies Programme. Today, the Confucius Institute at 
Universitas Al Azhar has Huang Bin as its Chinese director and Arifin Zain as 
its Indonesian director. The organization structure and relationship between 
the Universitas Al Azhar, the Hanban and Fujian Normal University (FNU)
is shown in Illustration 7.
Since 2014, the Institute has a new director, Huang Bin 黄彬, and working 
together with him are six Chinese language teachers from China, two males 
and four females. Some of these teachers are PhD graduates, but the majority 
are still post-graduate students who have a one-year contract only. One 
teacher does have a permanent appointment; he is a lecturer at FNU who 
signed a three-year contract with the Confucius Institute at the Universitas Al 
Azhar (2013-2016). All of them said that they are teaching Chinese language, 
but their methods can vary from singing to reading. The stated purpose is 
consistent with what has been noted by Belford (2002), that, “[T]he Chinese, 
for their part, are adamant the institutes are apolitical and purely focused on 
language and culture (see Appendix 2 for the Essence of Chinese culture)”.56 
Perhaps this has been a quite appropriate and effective course of action in 
the early stages of their establishment, since most of the students could not 
speak, read or write a fluent Chinese. My observations show that the Chinese 
teachers at the Confucius Institute, Universitas Al Azhar, can speak only a 
little Indonesian,57 so the senior students will help to translate when junior 
students do not understand what their teachers are trying to convey. The 
students taught in this Institute are actually students in the Chinese Studies 
Programme, Universitas Al Azhar.58 Therefore, these teachers from China 
56 In a booklet titled “Confucius Institute Online”, www.Chinese.cn, the essence of Chinese 
culture is to include: About China 概览, Cultural Heritage 文化遗产, Customs 民俗, Food 美
食, Tea and Wine 茶与酒 , TCM 中医, Travel 旅游, People 人物 , Literature 文学, Arts 艺术 
and Kung Fu 功夫,(http://www.chinesecio.com/cms/zh-hans/culture/culture-retrieval, 
accessed on 8-7-2014) .
57 This problem has also been observed by Shao Yiwu, a cultural counsellor with the Chinese 
Embassy in Indonesia. He has written that, “There are mainly three problems facing the 
development of Confucius Institutes based on what he saw in Indonesia. First, most Chinese 
language teachers and volunteers sent abroad cannot speak the local language, which inevitably 
affects their teaching style and method. Second, the work of the teachers and volunteers is 
assisted by various local Chinese associations, and they are scattered throughout the country, 
making it hard to form an effective management system. Third, their income is relatively low. 
Certain teachers and volunteers work and live in poor areas, but are not compensated through 
higher payments” (see “Confucius Institutes face uphill battle in development”, People’s Daily 
Online 31 May 2011.
58 Program Studi Sastra Cina at the Universitas Al Azhar was established in the year 2000, 
and it began with a diploma level (D3). It moved up to the S1 level in 2005. In its historical 
background, it is stated that the establishment of the Program Studi Sastra Cina, Universitas Al 
Azhar was motivated by the desire to become actively involved in global communication and 
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are doing the same job as the local ones, the majority of whom are graduates 
from the Universitas Indonesia.  
cooperation, particularly with China, which at the moment is at the peak of its development in 
social, political, cultural and industrial fields. This has been done on the basis of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s teaching which encourages his followers to”seek knowledge even in China”; 
and, in order to build a national unity and solidarity which includes ethnic Chinese, (http://
fs.uai.ac.id/cina/latar-belakang/, accessed on 26-1-2014).
The structure and relationship
Notes: Mr Murni Djamal previously was the Head of Faculty of Letters, Universitas Al Azhar, 
Silvia Rahmi is one of Chinese Studies Programme students who is in the final stages of her 
study, Kumala Dewi Wundari is a FNU graduate, Arifin Zain is from Badan Koordinasi 
Pembelajaran Bahasa Mandarin (BKPBM) – the Coordination Body for the Learning of 
Mandarin Language. Silvia and Dewi have recently resigned from PBM or CI, but there has 
not yet been any replacement.
Illustration 7. The organizational structure and relationship between the Universitas 
Al Azhar, Hanban, and Fujian Normal University (diagram by the author).
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One important aspect in the management of cooperation between the FNU, 
the Hanban and the Universitas Al Azhar, which has been noticed by one of 
these local teachers,59 is the difference in styles of management between three 
Chinese directors of the Confucius Institute at the Universitas Al Azhar. She 
claims that the first director, Li Qihui, was what she would call a bureaucrat; 
he was quite good in involving the local teachers in the Confucius Institute’s 
activities. The second director, Zhung Hua, was an academic, so he did not 
pay much attention to extra-curricular activities, nor was his management 
style as transparent as that of his predecessor. Huang Bin is a party secretary 
who has been assigned to FNU, so she thinks that he prefers to go straight to 
the vice-president of the PBM, Mr Murni Djamal, and does not involve local 
teachers in any of his plans. A specific function of the Confucius Institute at the 
Universitas Al Azhar, that is highly appreciated by students and local teachers 
alike, is the opportunity to go to China for three to six months training, or to 
pursue further studies at the Universitas Al Azhar’s Chinese counterpart in 
the establishment of the Confucius Institute: the Fujian Normal University. 
As one of the local teachers suggests, there is also “something special” which 
attracts students to the Chinese Studies Programme, Universitas Al Azhar.60 
It is not easy to determine the level of attraction the Confucius Institute exerts 
on the students, but from the number of students registered at the Programme 
between 2010-2013, a dramatic increase in the number of students can certainly 
be seen from directly after the Confucius Institute was established in 2010. 
Only eight students registered in 2010, but the number jumped to twenty-
three in 2011; although only nineteen students were active. In 2012 and 2013 
the numbers decreased slightly to twenty-one and seventeen students, with 
sixteen and fifteen active.61
culturAl exchAnge
As mentioned above, the official name of the Confucius Institute in Indonesia 
is Pusat Bahasa Mandarin, not ”Institut Konfusius”, which is actually the more 
direct translation of its title. Various sources have said that the name Pusat 
Bahasa Mandarin is used as a substitute for the ”Institut Konfusius” because 
Indonesian government officials had raised some concerns that it might be 
misinterpreted as a religious institute, since the name Confucius is related to 
agama Kong Hu Cu. As a matter of fact, Confucianism in Indonesia is generally 
known as a Chinese religion, or at least a religious characteristic of Chinese 
Indonesians. Clearly, the general understanding about Confucianism is quite 
particular and inadequate, reflecting sparseness of the Indonesian people’s 
knowledge about China. 
59 Interviewed on 18-7-2014.
60 “Ikatan Guru Mandarin (Ikatguma) Non-Tionghua Indonesia”, Facebook, 1 March 
2013, (https://www. facebook.com/permalink.php?id=167749926620069&story_
fbid=473449359383456, accessed on 22-1-2014).
61 The information was provided by the Head of Chinese Studies Programme, Santi Cempaka, 
in an email dated on 25-6-2014.
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Although the relationship between China and Indonesia was quite close 
during the period of 1949-1965,62 there was a long break in the diplomatic 
relationship between two countries from 1965 to 1990, after Indonesia 
unilaterally decided to cut off the relationship. After the normalization of the 
relationship in July 1990, even though trade between China and Indonesia 
was quite stable, in other fields of life, with it the picture of China began to 
change as well. China is now viewed with mixed feelings, fluctuating between 
admiration and reservation. As stated by the Indonesian Ambassador to China 
at the reception to celebrate 67th Indonesian Independence Day, held in the 
ballroom of China World Hotel in Beijing, 17 September 2012, “China is the 
most important partner for Indonesia”.63 In 2013, the two countries agreed to 
expand their bilateral relations into a comprehensive strategic partnership, 
which will cover a number of sectors: investment, trade, industry, food and 
energy, and tourism. Among the partnerships approved are cooperation on a 
China-Indonesia integrated industrial zone, a memorandum of understanding 
on research and technological development (capacity building and the transfer 
of technology), as well as agreement for cooperation on space exploration 
for peaceful purposes.64 Nevertheless, the still present reserved attitude 
towards China is reflected in Josh Chen’s writing titled “CAFTA Phobia or 
Sinophobia?” (2011), which argues against the various opinions blaming China 
for the flow of Chinese products into Indonesia.65
This government to government relationship is also inseparable from 
the problematic position of Chinese Indonesians in the Indonesian society. 
Chinese Indonesians are Indonesian citizens, but their loyalty is continually 
questioned. Conflicts which happened in the past are often raked up again 
and again. These eventually reach a peak in anti-Chinese sentiments which 
erupt from time to time. The 1998 May riots were the latest and the biggest 
disturbances ever to happen in the history of contemporary Indonesia. The 
role which can be played by this group in China’s soft power project might 
not be as important as it has been assumed. As we have seen, the contribution 
made by the Chinese community leaders to the Confucius Institute at the 
Universitas Al Azhar was prompted by a long-shot idealism. They hope 
that, through communication and cultural exchange, the Confucius Institute 
can help to lower the level of prejudice and racial intolerance among the 
indigenous Indonesians. 
Unfortunately, during this study, I have not yet been able to attend 
and observe any events organized by the Confucius Institute, Universitas 
Al Azhar. The last activity recorded was an international conference of All 
Confucius Institutes in Asia, held by Universitas Al Azhar at Sultan Hotel on 
26-27 May 2014, and attended by thirty-two countries, eighty-four Confucius 
62 See Liu Hong 2011.
63 “Dubes RI; China, partner terpenting buat Indonesia”, detiknews 18 September 2012.
64 “Ini 6 Kesepakatan RI-RRT”, Republika.co.id 2 October 2013.
65 Chen, Josh, “CAFTA Phobia atau Sinophobia?”, Baltyra.com 18 April 2011, (http://baltyra.
com/2011/04/18/ cafta-phobia-atau-sinophobia/, accessed on 27-1-2014).
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Institutes, representing a total of 180 participants.66 Perhaps, it would be very 
interesting to observe how the cultural activities and events activated by and 
exhibited in Confucius Institutes, as Alan H. Yang and Michael Hsiao suggest,67 
“are facilitated in a politically harmonious manner” by those people in the 
institutions, who “are educated and cultivated by a selective version of Chinese 
culture with propaganda contoured and framed by the Chinese government”. 
Even though, it should be noted that Yang and Hsiao also “strongly doubt 
[…] that the CI-related activities are combining cultural transmission with 
purposeful, explicit propaganda”.
Ardaiolo (2013: 11) himself puts an emphasis on the cultural exchange 
involved in studying at a Confucius Institute, saying that it is “the strongest 
determiner of Confucius Institute as an effective tool of Chinese public 
diplomacy”.68 He says that, “[…] – teachers are sent abroad by Hanban or the 
partnering Chinese institution – and this is beneficial to both the students and 
the teachers. The students enjoy immersive language and culture education, 
while the teachers are exposed to professional life in a foreign environment. 
Both parties have the potential to change their own assumptions and 
opinions of the other’s culture as well as their immediate family, friends and 
acquaintances”. My observations have led me to the same conclusion, because 
the stories brought home by the Indonesian students who have been to China 
clearly show the positive experience of cultural exchange.69 Ardaiola (2013:11) 
also sees the benefit of the joint-venture model – a Chinese university and 
a foreign partner, typically another university – for both the Chinese and 
the foreign universities. His case study shows “how China’s intention to 
promote its language and culture, and in turn boost its soft power, by way of 
Confucius Institutes is undermined by the reputation of its government”, and 
so he suggests “the [Chinese] government has to be as hands-off as possible” 
Ardaiolo (2013: 11). But would it be possible to do so when, at least in the 
Indonesian instance, the Indonesian partner institutions are relying on the 
Confucius Institute’s financial aid, particularly in the form of scholarships?70 
Critics of China’s soft power argue that “the Confucius Institutes fall 
66 “Konferensi Pusat Bahasa Mandarin di Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia”, 30 May 2014, 
(http://uai.ac.id /2014/05/30/konfrensi-pusat-bahasa-mandarin-di-universitas-al-azhar-
indonesia/, accessed on 10-7-2014). See also “UAI dukung perkembangan bahasa Mandarin 
di Indonesia”, Jaknewsonline.com 26 May 2014, (http://www.jaknewsonline.com/berita-1245-
uai-dukung-perkembangan-bahasa-mandarin-di-indonesia.html, accessed on 10-7-2014).
67 Yang and Hsiao 2012.
68 As mentioned before, Falk Hartig (2010: 1, abstract) believes that, Confucius Institutes 
should be understood as “a tool of cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”, because, 
on the basis of his study on Confucius Institutes in Germany, they “don’t do active propaganda 
[by telling lies and half-truths, b]ut also they don’t practice comprehensive and pure cultural 
diplomacy” (Hartig 2010: 11). 
69 See the experience of Mus from Aceh: “Pengalaman pertama di China; Ketika sim-card dan 
sisir jadi sendok dan garpu”, Kompasiana 2 Juni 2013. See also the experience of Arif Rahman 
Hakim, “Pengalaman di Beijing, China?”, 9 September 2011, (http://kimchiofmyheart.blogspot.
com/2011/12/pengalaman-di-beijing-china.html, accessed on 26-1-2014).
70 This situation is based on Feri Ansori’s description 1-8-2013.
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under the [Communist] party’s control”, because “intrinsically it’s all linked 
back to the policies of the Chinese Communist Party”. Moreover, the Hanban, 
the coordinator of Confucius Institute worldwide, which is affiliated with 
China’s ministry of education, even though it is said to be a non-government 
institution, its leaders, including its director, Xu Lin, are largely composed of 
Communist Party officials.71 However, it is far too difficult to discover how 
many directives were prearranged by the party; knowledge which would help 
to determine the direction of the relationship between Confucius Institutes 
and their host institutions abroad. Looking at the objective which, as Belford 
suggested,72  is to raise China’s image abroad, it is still too early to say for 
sure how effective it has been in the case of Indonesia. Nevertheless, when we 
observe the development of Chinese language studies in several Indonesian 
universities, we can see that, among Indonesian students, there is a growing 
interest in studying China and Chinese language in Indonesia73 and in pursuing 
further study in China. For example, In 2014, UIN (Universitas Islam Negeri, 
Muslim State University) Ar-Raniry, in Aceh, in cooperation with Wuhan 
University of Technology (with an agreement signed on 15 April 2014), sent 
seven of its female students to study in a Master’s programme in China.74 On 
the other hand, Universitas Andalas in Padang is making plans, following in 
the footsteps of Universitas Sumatera Utara in Medan, to open Chinese Studies 
Programme. On 4 April 2014, it invited Huang Bin from Confucius Institute 
at Universitas Al Azhar to ask for support from the Confucius Institute.75 A 
similar intention, to establish a centre of Chinese studies, has been voiced by 
UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta76 and UNISBANK (Universitas Stikubank) 
Semarang.77 However, this growing popularity of China or of studying about 
China should not be attributed solely to the Confucius Institute, because the 
saying of the Prophet “Tuntutlah ilmu walaupun sampai ke negeri China” (pursue 
knowledge even as far as China), which was publicly repeated by the fourth 
71 Belford 2012. See also Ardaiolo 2013, especially pages 10-11.
72 Belford 2012.
73 In relation to this, the Hanban reported that, “In 2012, the six Confucius Institutes in 
Indonesia provided 163 Chinese language training courses to more than 3,500 students. More 
than 70 cultural events were held, attracting about 18,000 people. And almost 1,400 people 
in Indonesia took part in the HSK, the Chinese language proficiency test” (see Zhao Xinying, 
“Confucius Institutes pick up language learners”, Asia Weekly 18 October 2013, http://epaper.
chinadailyasia.com/asia-weekly/article-1225.html, accessed on 14-7-2014).
74 Nazarullah, “Lagi, 7 Srikandi UIN Ar-Raniry lanjutkan kuliah ke China”, 9 Juli 2014, 
(http://uin.ar-raniry.ac.id/web/berita/detail/183/superadmin/lagi-7-srikandi-uin-ar-raniry-
lanjutkan-kuliah-ke-chin, accessed on 10-7-2014).
75 “Upaya melaksanakan mandat mendirikan Jurusan Sastra China”, 8 April 2014, (http://
www.unand.ac.id/id-/berita/universitas/2776-upaya-melaksanakan-mandat-mendirikan-
jurusan-sastra-china-, accessed on 10-7-2014).
76 Ahmad Fauzan Sazli, “UIN Jakarta siap dirikan Pusat Kajian China”,  29 April 2014, (http://
kabarkampus.com /2014/04/uin-jakarta-siap-dirikan-pusat-kajian-china/, accessed on 10-7-
2014).
77 “Unisbank MOU dengan Universitas Guangdong China”, 17 June 2014, (http://www.
unisbank.ac.id/berita-terbaru/unisbank-mou-dengan-universitas-guangdong-china-unisbank.
html, accessed on 10-7-2014).
170 171Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) Thung Ju Lan, Confucius Institute at Universitas Al Azhar, Jakarta 
President of Indonesia, Gus Dur or Abdurrahman Wahid,78 when he was alive, 
has now also become a dictum for many Indonesian Muslims.79 
China’s soft power is a difficult concept to measure on the basis of only 
experience of the Confucius Institute at the Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia. 
Attraction to China was already growing before the Confucius Institute was 
established. In the eyes of Indonesians, China is a big country which has long 
exerted its power through its diaspora and/or sale of its products. Hence the 
Confucius Institute is just one of the many forms of Chinese-ness with which 
they have to deal. Certainly the Confucius Institute might help to improve 
some negative impressions and dispel some of the reservations Indonesians 
have about China, but only among a limited number of people who are closely 
engaged with the institute. In spite of the “Confucius Institute of the Year” 
award received at December 2014, in general, the Confucius Institute at the 
Universitas Al Azhar has not done very much in the last four years; its biggest 
stumbling block being its own limitation in human resources. Nevertheless, 
the people in this institute80 believe that these four years have been only the 
first step because, since the beginning, they have been aware of the long road 
they have to follow before they can achieve real progress with the institute, 
and they have not given up yet.
confucIus InstItute As chInA’s soft power
Joseph Nye’s  soft power puts a strong emphasis on “the power of attraction” 
as a tool to persuade or “to shape the preferences of others” in the business 
and political worlds. This article discusses the Confucius Institute to illustrate 
what is called China’s soft power. To understand how this soft power – or the 
Confucius Institute - works, we have to determine the “observable” power of 
“intangible” attraction embedded in this Confucius Institute. This observable 
but intangible attraction is assumed to be “implanted” in the language and 
culture offered by the Institute, namely: what are known as “shared values”. 
However, without sitting in on its classes, it is difficult to see what values are 
being shared with the local students. In the case of the Confucius Institute 
at the Universitas Al Azhar, it is very apparent that the image of China itself 
has worked as an attraction. Kumaravadivelu (2012: 4) is right in saying that, 
“most learners abroad are inclined to see Mandarin as a communicational tool 
rather than as a cultural carrier. Their interest in Chinese language knowledge 
appears to be limited to the ability to communicate with the Chinese business 
community, or to live, study, and work in China. Their main motivation 
78 “Gusdur – Anak pesantren yang menaklukkan dunia”, AnneAhira.com, (http://www.
anneahira.com /gusdur. htm, accessed on 10-7-2014). See also “Islam: pribadi dan masyarakat 
oleh KH Abdurrahman Wahid”, NU Online, Taushiyah, 27 June 2014, (http://nu.or.id/a,public-
m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,6-id,52909-lang,id-c,taushiyah-t,Islam++ Pribadi+dan+Masyarakat-.
phpx, accessed on 10-7-2014).
79  See Dini, Bina Izzatu, “Seek knowledge, even if you have to go to China for it”, 
Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia Tiongkok, 24 December 2013, (http://www.ppitiongkok.org/
halkomentar-165-87.html, accessed on 18-7-2014).
80  Interviewed on 18-7-2014.
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is to benefit from Chinese economic expansion. Their interest in Chinese 
cultural-knowledge is focused on cultural awareness, rather than cultural 
assimilation or cultural accommodation”. Obviously, for these people – the 
Indonesians included - the Confucius Institute provides a channel by which 
to know China, to understand China and the Chinese people, and perhaps 
to penetrate China. Therefore, as long as China’s impressive economic and 
scientific achievements continue to attract people’s attention, I think the 
Confucius Institute – particularly Confucius Institute at Al Azhar which 
is located in the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta – will continue to have a 
“strategic significance” in enhancing friendship and mutual understanding 
between China and other nations and to some extent, in elevating China’s 
influence in the international community.
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